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Abstract: In 2004, the U.K. parliament passed the Civil Partnership Act which 
provides a scheme to enable same-sex couples to obtain formal 
recognition of their relationships through the registration of a civil 
partnership. When the Civil Partnership Bill was making its way 
through parliament, attempts were made in the House of Lords to 
derail the Bill through amendments seeking to extend the Bill to 
certain familial relationships of care and support. In order to counter 
these attempts and to facilitate the removal of the amendments, the 
government gave the assurance that the matter of the economically 
vulnerable cohabitant would be referred back to the Law 
Commission for England and Wales for review. Consequently, in July 
2005, the Law Commission commenced its project on cohabitation. 
This paper seeks to examine models of reform (such as the one 
proposed by the Law Society of England and Wales in its 2002 
Cohabitation report) as well as those introduced in other 
Commonwealth countries. The aim is to identify some of the crucial 
questions that the Law Commission will need to give careful 
consideration to if they are to make recommendations that will 
provide a more radical approach to this area of the law, rather than 
adopt the more conservative approach of including cohabitation in 
‘piggy back’ mode on the marriage model.  
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The Law Commission for England and Wales (hereafter ‘the Law Commission’) 
commenced its project on cohabitation in July 2005. This was a result of the U.K. 
government’s tactical move during the passage of the Civil Partnership Bill1 to 
counter the attempts made to derail the Bill through amendments introduced in the 
House of Lords.  By way of brief background, those amendments sought to extend 
                                                 
1
 The Bill has since been passed as the Civil Partnership Act 2004 and came into force in December 2005. 
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the Bill to certain long-term non-sexual caring and stable relationships on the 
ground that, if the Bill was not “a gay marriage Bill but one about removing 
injustice” (Baroness O’Cathain, H.L. Hansard, 24 June 2004, col. 1363), the 
economic vulnerability of those in caring relationships equally merit attention. The 
government had, however, consistently maintained throughout the period of the 
parliamentary debates that the Civil Partnership Bill was not the appropriate place 
to deal with any relationships other than same-sex partnerships.  In order to gain 
support in the House of Commons for the removal of the Lords’ amendments, the 
government assured the House that the matter of the economically vulnerable 
cohabitant, opposite-sex and same-sex, would be referred back to the Law 
Commission for review in its Ninth Programme of Law Reform in 2005 (Jacqui 
Smith, H.C. Hansard, 12 October 2004, col. 179). The government was clearly 
cautious to limit any review of the law relating to close personal adult relationships 
to only cohabitants, rather than a wider range of interdependent relationships. 
 Accordingly, the Law Commission’s project on cohabitation focuses on the 
financial hardship suffered by cohabitants, opposite-sex and same-sex, or their 
children on the termination of the relationship by separation or death, and not 
those who are in familial and non-familial relationships of care and support. This 
includes considering matters such as providing access to a property redistribution 
regime and to financial provision. The Law Commission had, in its earlier Sharing 
Homes discussion paper (2002), observed the greater need for the law to provide 
remedies to home-sharers2 but had then refrained from making any 
                                                 
2
 The Law Commission’s reference to the term ‘home-sharers’ extends to a wider range of home-sharing 
relationships and is not limited only to relationships involving cohabitants. 
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recommendations on possible legal reform.3 In that year, the Law Society of 
England and Wales (hereafter ‘the Law Society’) also published its Cohabitation 
report (2002), in which it proposed a two-tiered system: a registration scheme for 
same-sex relationships which would provide registered partners with rights 
analogous to those for married couples; and a presumptive system which would 
confer lesser rights and responsibilities to opposite-sex and same-sex cohabitants 
on their satisfying certain criteria (e.g. a minimum period of cohabitation or the 
presence of children, and conjugality). 
 At present, it remains unclear whether, but appears highly probable that, the 
Law Commission is likely to recommend a presumptive system whereby rights and 
responsibilities will be ascribed to cohabitants. But it is not certain that the 
Commission will mirror the approach taken by the Law Society back in 2002 and 
recommend a presumptive model similar to the Law Society’s. It is possible that 
the Law Commission may look to the models adopted by other Commonwealth 
countries such as Australia, where legislation has been introduced at sub-national 
level to deal with the financial and property matters of not only cohabitants but also 
those in caring relationships (although any recommendations by the Law 
Commission will not extend to the latter group). Given the possibilities, it remains 
highly speculative what direction the Law Commission is likely to take and what its 
recommendations are likely to be. This paper seeks to explore these various 
possibilities and more specifically to consider the effectiveness of these various 
models in addressing the economic vulnerability of cohabitants. Moreover, most 
reform proposals have been based on stretching the marriage model to 
                                                 
3
 For a fuller discussion of the Law Commission’s Sharing Homes discussion paper, see Wong (2003); Miles 
(2003); Mee (2004). 
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cohabitation as a means of extending rights and responsibilities (Bottomley & 
Wong 2006) but have only limited effect because of the ideologies of law with 
which the marriage model is imbued with. The paper, therefore, seeks to identify 
some of the questions that will require careful consideration by the Law 
Commission in its consultation process in order for more progressive reform to be 
introduced which will transgress the marriage model as its starting point. 
 
 
CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION AS A QUALIFYING RELATIONSHIP 
 
The criteria used for defining a qualifying cohabitation in most presumptive models 
have tended to use the marriage model as the starting point. This is not 
unsurprising since the genesis of most of these models have invariably been the 
extension of some of the rights and privileges enjoyed by married couples to 
opposite-sex cohabitants. As the Australian experience demonstrates, most of the 
sub-national legislation was initially passed to provide opposite-sex cohabitants 
with access to a property redistribution regime at the breakdown of their 
relationships (see, for instance, the New South Wales De Facto Relationships Act 
19844 and Tasmania’s De Facto Relationships Act 19995). All of the Australian 
sub-national legislation has at different times been amended to extend to same-
sex couples as well, and some has even been extended to familial and non-familial 
relationships of care and support (e.g. Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (New 
                                                 
4
 This statute was amended by the Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999 and renamed 
the Property (Relationships) Act 1984. 
5
 The 1999 Act was subsequently repealed and replaced by the Relationships Act 2003. 
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South Wales); Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (Australian Capital Territory); 
Relationships Act 2003 (Tasmania)). For the purposes of this paper, I will focus 
only on the criteria used in defining qualifying relationships between cohabitants 
(which in the case of the Australian statutes are referred to as “de facto 
relationships”). 
 What is evident in the Australian context is that the definition adopted by the 
statutes, when they were applicable only to opposite-sex cohabitation, was one 
based on the marriage model. For instance, both the 1984 New South Wales and 
1999 Tasmania de facto legislation previously defined de facto partners as being a 
man and a woman who live together as man and wife and are not married to each 
other. However, in a move to extend the legislation to same-sex couples, a gender-
neutral definition was adopted to replace this ‘marriage-like’ definition. Thus de 
facto partners are re-defined as two persons who live together as a couple 
(Property (Relationships) Act 1984, s.4(1)) or have a relationship as a couple 
(Relationships Act 2003, s.4(1)) and are not married or related to each other.  
The adoption of a gender-neutral definition of cohabitants raises various 
concerns for different groups. Firstly, this de-sexing of intimate opposite-sex and 
same-sex couple relationships suggests that, while status remains the gateway to 
accessing the law, the objective of the statutes is to provide not formal recognition 
of such status but recognition of the fact that economic vulnerability can result as a 
consequence of interdependency which close intimate relationships may 
engender. It gives a framework for dealing with financial and property matters of 
the parties, arising out of this interdependency, at the end of the relationship. This 
argument is clearly one which other groups, particularly those in relationships of 
care and support, have latched on to. To some extent, similar arguments were 
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relied upon in the U.K. by the proponents of the amendments made to the Civil 
Partnership Bill in the House of Lords. They also pave the way, at least in the 
Australian context, for the further extension of the de facto legislation to a wider 
range of close personal relationships, but ones which do not necessarily carry with 
them the presence of a sexual relationship between the parties.  
 In Australia, the adoption of a gender-neutral definition of qualifying 
cohabiting relationships, however, proved problematic for some gay and lesbian 
activists. In particular, the Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby in New South Wales, in 
an emphatic response to government proposals in 1999 to amend the then de 
facto legislation, made it very clear that a totally gender-neutral definition such as 
that adopted in the Australian Capital Territory (Domestic Relationships Act 1994, 
s.3) should be avoided.6 The adoption of a gender-neutral definition, which focuses 
on interdependency as the basis for recognising a relationship, no doubt has the 
potential for allowing a wider range of close personal relationships to piggy back on 
that definition to access the law. This approach also has the potential to destabilise 
the notion of heterosexuality and the hetero-nuclear family (Millbank & Sant 2000). 
Millbank and Morgan (2001), however, argue that legal reform which makes no 
reference to the parties’ sexual relations is less radical because, in de-sexing 
cohabiting relationships, it renders the sexuality of the parties invisible. Same-sex 
relationships are therefore ‘normalised’ as domestic/interdependent/property 
relationships.7 A major drawback for same-sex couples is that no recognition is 
                                                 
6
 The Domestic Relationships Act 1994 provides a general definition of domestic relationships which include 
de facto relationships as well as caring relationships. Unlike the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 and the 
Relationships Act 2003, the 1994 Act does not make a distinction between either of these relationships.  
7
 See also Barker (2006) in this issue. 
Kent Academic Repository – http://kar.kent.ac.uk  
Published version available in ‘Feminist Legal Studies 14 (2). pp. 145-145. ISSN 0966-3622’ 
- 7 - 
 
 
given to the (sexual) celebration of their intimate relationships as the law renders 
lesbian and gay subjecthood and sexuality invisible (Millbank & Morgan 2001, p.  
315).  
 Notwithstanding a purported move away from the marriage model in 
definitional terms, the Australian statutes evince a kind of ‘retreat’ to that model. 
The courts may take into consideration a list of non-exhaustive factors in 
determining whether a de facto relationship exists (Property (Relationships) Act 
1984, s.4(2); Relationships Act 2003, s.4(3)).8 The factors specified include: the 
duration of the parties’ relationship; the nature and extent of a common residence; 
whether or not a sexual relationship exists; the care and support of children; and 
the reputation and public aspects of the relationship. As Millbank and Sant (2000) 
explain, this list is problematic because it has its origins and history in heterosexual 
de facto law which is based on a comparison with marriage. Some of the listed 
factors are therefore not relevant to same-sex relationships and might have a 
negative impact on establishing the existence of a de facto relationship. Further, as 
the presence of a sexual relationship is one of the relevant factors, conjugality is 
re-introduced by the back door in determining whether a particular relationship 
qualifies. 
 Relatedly, the question of inclusion also hinges on whether a cohabitation 
requirement is absolutely necessary. Here, we see differences in approach in the 
Australian context. While most sub-national statutes do impose a cohabitation 
                                                 
8
 Both statutes provide that, in deciding whether two persons are in a de facto relationship, the courts may 
take into account any one or more of the factors listed. But a finding of one or more of the listed factors is not 
necessary, and the courts may also take into account other matters which may seem appropriate in the 
circumstances of the case. 
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requirement,9 some have begun to challenge the need for cohabitation as a 
precursor to interdependency. Consequently, statutes such as the Domestic 
Relationships Act 1994 and the Relationships Act 2003 have omitted the 
cohabitation requirement for a couple’s relationship to qualify. A key argument 
against the cohabitation requirement is that it renders a definition under-inclusive. 
Interdependence arises because of the structural aspects of a relationship (e.g. the 
(sexual) division of labour, arrangements relating to the economic activity or 
inactivity of the parties, the allocation and control of family income, etc.).  As such, 
interdependence can equally arise in non-cohabiting relationships and cohabitation 
should not be used as an essential indicator of interdependence for the purposes 
of inclusion. This leads Millbank and Sant (2000, p. 208) to argue in favour of the 
broader ‘relational’ interdependence approach adopted in statutes like the 
Domestic Relationships Act 1994 which does not impose a cohabitation 
requirement. 
 However, in the U.K. (judging from the Law Society’s 2002 report as well as 
the Law Commission’s statements on their web site relating to their project on 
cohabitation), it would seem that a narrower approach to reform is being 
envisaged. In its 2002 report, the Law Society recommended that some level of 
protection ought to be extended to opposite-sex and same-sex cohabitants through 
an ascription model. It also considered the question of whether the term 
‘cohabitation’ ought to be extended to other cohabiting non-sexual interdependent 
relationships. This was, however, rejected on the ground that drafting a sufficiently 
inclusive definition to capture the more varied nature of such relationships would 
                                                 
9
 A minimum two-year cohabitation period is required unless there is a child to the relationship, in which case 
a shorter period of cohabitation is permissible.  
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be too difficult.  The Law Society then stuck to the narrower project of looking at 
only couple-based cohabiting relationships, without addressing the broader 
question of whether reform should also be extended to non-cohabiting couples 
facing similar financial difficulties.   
 The Law Society’s choice of definition for a qualifying relationship is 
somewhat narrower than that currently adopted by the Australian statutes for de 
facto partners. Given the Law Society’s focus was only on cohabiting couples, the 
need for a cohabitation requirement was taken as a given and was not in any 
sense challenged by the Law Society. The Law Society then proceeded to 
consider the different definitions of cohabitation currently adopted in various legal 
sources in the U.K. such as statutes and by the Department of Work and Pensions. 
In a rather unimaginative move, it then proceeded to recommend what is by now a 
familiar definition of cohabitation, very much wedded to the marriage model: that is, 
cohabitation is a relationship between “two persons (either opposite or same sex) 
living together in the same household in a relationship analogous to that of 
husband and wife” (2002, at para. 55).10 This resort to a marriage-like definition of 
cohabitation for both opposite-sex and same-sex cohabitation is problematic. The 
marriage-like approach taken in the Law Society model is further reinforced by the 
recommendation of a non-exhaustive list of factors to guide the courts in 
determining whether a cohabiting relationship qualifies (Law Society 2002, p. 13). 
The very first factor on the list is whether or not the parties have a sexual 
relationship. Other factors include whether the parties demonstrate traits of a 
married couple, for example: holding joint accounts; the provision of financial 
                                                 
10
 The minimum period of cohabitation required under the Law Society’s model is similar to that in the 
Australian statutes, i.e. two years unless there is a child of the parties. 
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support; the sharing of a household; and whether the parties socialise together 
and/or are known as a couple. 
 What we see is a stretching of the marriage model to accommodate the 
inclusion of other close personal relationships (Bottomley & Wong 2006). This 
assumes that the marriage model itself is unproblematic and is indeed a 
satisfactory template. The basis for inclusion of other types of close personal 
relationships such as opposite-sex and same-sex cohabitation must thus be based 
on similarity or sameness. As has been argued elsewhere (Bottomley & Wong 
2006), the ‘logic of semblance’ has a serious limiting effect as it provides little 
space for more radical reform to be thought through in this area, and the potential 
for extending such reform to a wider group of relationships will involve the 
(un)necessary stretching of the marriage model even further.  
 
 
BASIS FOR PROPERTY REDISTRIBUTION 
 
The next issue which the Law Commission will need to grapple with is the basis 
upon which financial and property matters of cohabitants are to be resolved at the 
end of their relationships. Here, we see the possibility of adopting an approach 
based upon either property law or family law or, indeed, a combination of both. In 
its 2002 discussion paper, the Law Commission had considered a property law 
approach where rights over the shared home would be determined solely by 
contributions made, financial and non-financial. Such rights would arise as from the 
time the scheme takes hold (e.g. by making relevant contributions), and would take 
effect and be binding on third parties like any other beneficial interests in property. 
Kent Academic Repository – http://kar.kent.ac.uk  
Published version available in ‘Feminist Legal Studies 14 (2). pp. 145-145. ISSN 0966-3622’ 
- 11 - 
 
 
However, the Law Commission rejected making any proposals for such a statutory 
scheme on the grounds that the scheme would provide insufficient flexibility for 
taking into account the various contributions made within a diverse range of home-
sharing relationships. This conclusion is unsurprising given that, as acknowledged 
by the Law Commission itself, a key problem with that putative scheme was the 
lack of consideration being given to ‘intention’ as a prerequisite for acquiring a 
beneficial interest in the property.11 
 A family law approach, on the other hand, has the advantage of being more 
responsive to the nuanced nature of close personal relationships. The approach is 
remedial in nature in that the courts are given discretion to decide what awards 
and orders ought to be granted. Courts are able to give fuller consideration to the 
actual needs of the parties when deciding what remedies are most appropriate in 
each case. It would allow the courts to adopt what John Dewar (1998) describes as 
a “functional approach” towards identifying what particular property rights over the 
shared home would benefit the claimants; this need not be an award of a share in 
beneficial ownership but might instead be a monetary or an occupational award.   
 But more importantly, when dealing with issues of cohabitation, the choice 
between a property law and a family law approach is not always clear cut. This 
choice in part depends upon the objective of reform. If it is merely a question of 
property rights, clearly a property law approach is to be preferred. However, in 
most cohabitation cases, the issue of property rights is only one of many issues 
that require resolution at the end of the relationship, in which case a family law 
                                                 
11
 The ‘intention’ requirement has, however, proved highly problematic in the family property context, 
especially in the area of trusts law. For a fuller discussion on the weaknesses of an intention-based approach 
to resolving property disputes, see Gardner (1993); Clarke (1998); Glover & Todd (1996). 
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approach, arguably, offers greater potential (Miles 2003). Yet, the family law route 
is not without its problems.  
 The approach taken in the Australian statutes is more in line with a family 
law approach, in that access for couples is status-based (i.e. as de facto partners) 
and the courts have powers to make at their discretion property adjustment orders 
(and limited financial orders) at the end of a relationship.12 But the statutes adopt 
different bases upon which a court may exercise its discretion in making a property 
adjustment order. The Property (Relationships) Act 1984 adopts a mixed 
family/property law approach in that the exercise of discretion is based solely on 
what seems “just and equitable” to the court. But the question of what is “just and 
equitable” must be decided on a property law contributions-based method, i.e. 
having regard only to the contributions referred to paragraphs (a) and (b) of s.20. 
These include financial and non-financial contributions made towards the 
acquisition, conservation or improvement of the property and contributions as a 
homemaker and parent. On the other hand, the Domestic Relationships Act 1994 
and the Relationships Act 2003 take a more family law orientated approach. The 
court’s discretion under these statutes is not limited to taking into account only 
those types of financial and non-financial contributions; there is wider scope to 
                                                 
12
 It should be noted that the Australian sub-national statutes deal only with property issues. Divorce and 
matrimonial proceedings, on the other hand, are dealt with under the Federal jurisdiction: see the Family Law 
Act 1975, which is similar to the U.K. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (as amended). Distinctions, therefore, 
remain between the sub-national statutes and the Family Law Act 1975 in respect of the orders that may be 
made and the factors to be taken into account. The only Australian state where there has been a wholesale 
transplantation of the Family Law Act 1975 into state de facto legislation is Western Australia: see the Family 
Court Act 1997.  
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consider other factors such as the financial resources and needs of the parties 
(Domestic Relationships Act 1994, s.15; Relationships Act 2003, ss.40 & 47(2)).  
 The Law Society similarly adopts an approach that is located within the 
family law tradition. Under its putative model, access to the law for cohabitants is 
status-based, with remedies to be awarded at the courts’ discretion. The model 
allows financial and non-financial contributions (including contributions as a 
homemaker) to be taken into account in determining whether capital provision 
should be made at the termination of the relationship, which could be either a 
property adjustment order or a lump sum payment. But the Law Society draws a 
distinction between this approach and that for ancillary relief on divorce. Unlike 
divorce, the basis upon which capital provision is to be made to a cohabitant does 
not take into account matters such as the financial resources of the parties and/or 
their present and future needs. Instead, capital provision may only be made on the 
basis of a “fair account … of any economic advantage derived by either party from 
the contributions of the other, and of any economic disadvantages suffered by 
either party in the interest of the other or of the family” (2002, p. 61). This principle 
is lifted from s.9(1)(b) of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985. There are, however, 
key differences between the Law Society model and the 1985 Act in terms of the 
application of the ‘fair account’ principle, which are discussed in more detail below.  
 At first glance, the alternative approaches to property redistribution taken in 
the Australian statutes, as well as in the Law Society model, appear to offer more 
to cohabitants than hitherto available under common law and equitable doctrines.  
This is especially the case in relation to the law’s treatment of non-financial 
contributions. As the threshold for making a property adjustment order under the 
Australian statutes is that it must be “just and equitable” to do so, the provision of 
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contributions, financial and non-financial, potentially calls for a restitutionary 
remedy.13 A similar logic is also found in the Law Society’s ‘fair account’ approach 
towards property adjustment. In these cases, the issues that arise are: whether the 
claimant has made relevant contributions which benefit either the other party to the 
relationship or his/her property; whether the claimant has received in return any 
countervailing benefits from the other party; and whether, in the light of the first two 
considerations, there is any value (enrichment) remaining in the other party’s 
hands that calls for a reversal.  
With this subtle shift towards property redistribution models that inherently 
focus on restitution, there are at least two problems raised which require further 
consideration. First, the weighing up of contributions made against benefits received for the purposes 
of a (restitutionary) award may prove problematic at a practical level. The difficulty 
lies in determining the point at which the contributions, especially purely domestic contributions, actually outweigh 
the benefits received so as to justify what is ‘fair’ and what sort of restitutionary award ought 
to be made. In other words, a property adjustment order may only be made if the 
contributions manifestly exceed the benefits received. A claimant must therefore show some element of 
detriment or that her contributions have resulted in the enrichment of the defendant which is unjust. The difficultly 
of establishing detriment in these cases relates back to a point made earlier about 
reform using the marriage model as a starting point without problematising 
marriage as a normative concept. Given the way in which the marriage model is 
imbued with certain ideologies of law, Diduck (2001), using marital cases as 
                                                 
13
 This is particularly the case with the contributions-based approach adopted in the Property (Relationships) 
Act 1984; cf. the Domestic Relationships Act 1994 and the Relationships Act 2003, which take a more 
relational approach towards the resolution of the parties’ financial and property matters by permitting needs 
to be taken into consideration. An award, therefore, does not merely perform a restitutionary function of 
reversing any imbalance suffered based on contributions alone. 
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examples,14 demonstrate how the notion of ‘fairness’, as a legal construct, is based 
on gendered assumptions made about the roles which parties to a relationship are 
expected to undertake. Bailey-Harris (1998) similarly observes that these 
stereotyped assumptions (especially about women’s roles in domestic 
relationships) have consequently led the courts to treat domestic contributions 
made by a female claimant as having no, or little, economic value since they are 
made out of ‘love and affection’. However, similar contributions by a man are more 
likely to be treated as acts of detrimental reliance that are capable of giving rise to 
an entitlement in the shared home.15 Furthermore, the appropriate share to be 
awarded depends on the balancing of contributions made and benefits received. It 
requires some imbalance which must be remedied through making of an 
adjustment order. This means that the courts will inevitably have to grapple with 
the second issue of assessing the value of contributions made. 
 The use of restitutionary models can be problematic given the difficulties 
surrounding existing legal constructions of non-financial contributions such as 
unpaid caregiving.16 This is particularly evident in trusts cases where no value has 
been given by the courts to non-financial contributions for the purposes of 
establishing an intention to acquire a beneficial interest in the shared home. The 
provision of unpaid caregiving is equally problematic in establishing detrimental 
reliance in these trusts cases as well as in estoppel cases, where the tendency of 
                                                 
14
 In particular the case of White v. White [2000] 2 F.L.R. 981. 
15
 See e.g. Burns v. Burns [1984] Ch. 317; Lloyds Bank v. Rosset [1991] 1 A.C. 197; c.f. Wayling v. Jones 
[1995] 2 F.L.R. 1029. See also Wong (2006a). 
16
 I use the term ‘unpaid caregiving’ to include a wide range of unpaid contributions to the welfare of the 
other party to the relationship and/or the family constituted by them such as domestic labour, contributions of 
a homemaker, childcare, care for the other party and/or family members due to age, illness, disability, etc. 
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the courts is to give weight to such contributions only where they are seen as 
exceptional.17 It is argued that these statutory models are unlikely to bring about 
greater benefits to claimants, especially female claimants, who have provided 
mostly non-financial contributions.18 For many feminists, the way in which law 
currently deals (or does not deal) with unpaid caregiving continues to raise 
concerns (see, for example, O’Donovan 1985; Neave 1991; Flynn & Lawson 1995; 
Lawson 1996; Wong 1998; Diduck 2001).  The adoption of the ‘fair account’ 
approach in the Law Society model is not enough to meet these concerns. With no 
scope for the parties’ needs to be considered in conjunction with their 
contributions, the model proposed by the Law Society still allows tensions with 
property law to remain, leading to disputes about whether the contributions made, 
especially indirect non-financial contributions, are of sufficient value to provide an 
advantage or a disadvantage which needs to be addressed by making an 
adjustment order.  
 The Law Society’s restitution-style model also creates an approach that is 
somewhat different from that currently available to cohabitants seeking to apply for 
reasonable financial provision from a deceased partner’s estate under the 
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. On an application by 
a cohabitant under the 1975 Act,19 the court must have regard to factors such as 
                                                 
17
 Ottey v. Grundy [2003] E.W.C.A. Civ. 716; Campbell v. Griffin [2001] E.W.C.A. Civ. 990. See also 
Bottomley (2006) in this issue. 
18
 The limitations of using a restitutionary approach apply not only to statutory models but also to equitable 
doctrines. For a fuller discussion on the limitations of using equitable doctrines in the family property 
context, see Wong (1999). 
19
 An application may be made by a cohabitant who has cohabited with the deceased in the same household 
for two years prior to the date when the deceased died: see s.1(1)(ba), (1A) of the 1975 Act. Where the period 
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the present and future financial resources and needs of the applicant, the 
obligations and responsibilities of the deceased and the size and nature of the 
deceased’s estate (s.3(1)) as well as the length of the parties’ cohabitation, the age 
of the applicant and the contributions made by the applicant to the welfare of the 
deceased’s family (s.3(2A)). However, unlike the ‘fair account’ approach proposed 
in the Law Society’s model, the test for determining whether an order for 
reasonable financial provision should be made is not dependent on any imbalance 
between the maintenance provided by the deceased and the contributions made 
by the applicant during the parties’ relationship. Rather, the aim is to address the 
applicant’s dependency and an order may therefore be made by the court where 
the lack of provision is unreasonable and irrespective of any economic 
disadvantage or advantage on the part of the applicant.         
 One reason why the mere transplantation of the ‘fair account’ approach 
found in s.9(1)(b) of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 is not of itself sufficient 
lies in the fact that that core principle is not a stand-alone principle in the 1985 Act. 
There is a crucial first principle that has been omitted by the Law Society, which 
the ‘fair account’ principle complements. That first core principle provides generally 
for community of property, that is the fair sharing in the value of assets classified 
as ‘matrimonial property’ (Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, s.9(1)(a)). Matrimonial 
property includes the shared home if acquired before or after the marriage with the 
intention that it is to be used as the parties’ family home. The 1985 Act further 
provides that ‘fair sharing’ means sharing the matrimonial property equally or in 
such proportions as are justified in the circumstance (s.10(1)). The second (fair 
                                                                                                                                                    
of cohabitation is less than two years, a cohabitant may satisfy the test of dependency under s.1(1)(e) of the 
Act.  
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account) principle only applies where a share in the value of the matrimonial 
property is insufficient to correct any imbalance that may still exist in terms of the 
advantages or disadvantages sustained by either of the parties to the relationship. 
This shifts the focus away from grounding an adjustment order application on 
contributions alone and provides greater recognition of the parties’ relationship as 
a joint partnership.  
 The use of a family law approach, therefore, does not necessarily resolve 
the kind of problems identified above if contributions remain, whether to a greater 
or lesser extent, an essential aspect of determining entitlements over the shared 
home. Unless the model embraces a more relational approach, there will be no 
space within that model for consideration of crucial matters such as the nature of 
the parties’ relationship, the diversity of the arrangements made within the 
relationship especially in terms of their financial and non-financial contributions, 
whether these contributions have been made towards the relationship as a joint 
partnership, etc. The model will remain vulnerable to discrimination, as 
stereotypical assumptions about the parties are allowed to apply, and to 
unpredictability about the outcomes in cases. A conservative valuation of these 
contributions will result in the court either drawing the conclusion that the claimant 
has suffered no detriment or reducing the share to be awarded to her.  
 
 
FINANCIAL PROVISION ORDERS 
 
In most of the cohabitation models, a sharp distinction is maintained between 
marriage and cohabitation. One of the key areas where such distinction is evident 
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is in the area of financial ancillary relief. All the Australian statutes discussed in this 
paper have sought to reiterate that, unlike in marriage, there is no duty to maintain 
a de facto partner, nor has a de facto partner a right to claim maintenance from the 
other partner (Property (Relationships) Act 1984, s.26; Domestic Relationships Act 
1994, s.18; Relationships Act 2003, s.46). The courts are, however, given powers 
to make limited orders of maintenance but these are mainly for situations where 
the other partner’s earning capacity is constrained by childcare responsibilities 
and/or she requires re-training in order to get back into the labour market. Thus, in 
determining whether to make a maintenance order, the courts may consider 
factors such as the financial resources, income and property of each party, the 
financial needs and obligations of each party, their responsibilities to support any 
other person and the physical and mental capacity of each party to take on gainful 
employment. These factors mirror some but not all the factors which the courts are 
entitled to take into consideration in marital proceedings.20 They point mainly to 
maintenance orders being available only for limited periods (to enable re-training)21 
and where there are minor children living with one of the parties.22  
                                                 
20
 The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s.25(2), for example, has a longer list which includes as well factors 
such as the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage, the contributions each party 
has made or is likely to make in the foreseeable future to the family’s welfare, and the conduct of each party. 
21
 Both the Property (Relationships) Act 1984, s.30(2), and the Domestic Relationships Act 1994, s.22(3), 
place a maximum duration of three years after the maintenance order is made or four years from the time the 
relationship has ended, whichever is the shorter period. 
22
 In the case of a maintenance order for a child, the maximum duration of such an order should not exceed 
the period expiring when the child attains the age of 12, or where the child suffers from any mental or 
physical disability, the age of 16. See Property (Relationships) Act 1984, s.30(1); Domestic Relationships Act 
1994, s.22(2).  
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 In the same vein, the Law Society had also recommended that there should 
not be any general right for maintenance imposed on cohabitants.  The view taken 
was that some interim financial support might be appropriate where the parties 
have lived to together for a certain length of time (although no indication was given 
as what length of time would be necessary) and have minor children living with 
them (2002, para. 111). In such cases, the Law Society has stated that any 
maintenance awarded should prima facie be designed to enable one to train, or 
retrain, in order to find more lucrative employment and/or to reflect any loss which, 
after taking a fair account of the economic advantages and disadvantages of the 
relationship, cannot be adequately compensated by a capital provision. The Law 
Society also took the view that, in line with the ‘clean break’ principle, a maximum 
duration of four years should be placed on maintenance orders unless there were 
exceptional circumstances. 
 What this translates into is a regime for making financial provision to 
cohabitants that is narrower than that for married couples in matrimonial 
proceedings. The model being proposed by the Law Society is more closely 
aligned to the approach taken in New South Wales and the Australian Capital 
Territory. However, if the overarching objective is to address economic 
vulnerability, this begs the question whether the Law Commission should consider 
a broader approach which mirrors more closely the ones provided to married 
couples and civil partners. In particular, the Law Commission ought to consider 
whether there should in fact be any time ceilings (whether of three years or fours 
years) placed on the duration of such maintenance orders.  Here, the Law 
Commission may take its cue from the more relational approach by Tasmania in 
the Relationships Act 2003.  
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 While the 2003 Act states specifically that one de facto partner is not liable 
to maintain the other partner, the powers given to courts to make maintenance 
orders are wider than those under the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 and the 
Domestic Relationships Act 1994. The factors which the courts are entitled to take 
into consideration under the 2003 Act are also wider than the ones in the latter 
statutes but are not as extensive as those found in s.75 of the Family Law Act 
1975 relating to spousal maintenance. More crucially, the Relationships Act 2003 
does place any time ceilings on the duration of maintenance orders made to de 
facto partners. This, arguably, allows the Relationships Act 2003 to respond more 
flexibly to the economic difficulties faced by a de facto partner at the termination of 
the relationship. Thus, the Law Commission will have to consider whether setting 
restrictions on the duration of financial orders will serve to address the economic 
vulnerability of the cohabitant in a more effective manner. If they do not, the better 
route would be to follow that taken by Tasmania, where discretion is left to the 
courts to determine for how long maintenance orders should run in order to enable 
a cohabitant to take steps to overcome her economic vulnerability and secure long-
term financial independence. 
 
 
OPTING-OUT PROVISIONS – SPACE FOR CONSIDERING NEW WAYS OF 
GOVERNING COHABITATION? 
 
Another issue that the Law Commission will need to deal with in its project is 
whether recommendations should be made for a registration or a presumptive 
scheme. In its 2002 report, the Law Society favoured a presumptive system as the 
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fallback default position for all cohabitants, opposite and same sex. While the Law 
Society recognised that a registration scheme would provide greater certainty for 
cohabitants, in that they would have to expressly opt into the system in order to 
enjoy any rights and privileges, it felt that this benefit was outweighed by the 
drawbacks of registration (2002, paras. 31-35). In particular, one of the key 
drawbacks was that those who are most unlikely to formalise their relationship 
would remain so even with a registration system and opposite-sex cohabitants may 
be disadvantaged by unscrupulous partners who might refuse to register. In 
addition, it would create a two-tier opposite-sex partnership system.  
 On the other hand, one of the main concerns of an ascription model is that 
parties covered by the statute will not have any choice as to whether or not they 
want their relationships regulated by the law.23 To counter this, autonomy 
arguments favour giving cohabitants the choice to opt out of the statutory scheme. 
This then raises the question of the extent to which cohabitants may be given 
autonomy to structure their own relationships and make arrangements regarding 
financial and property matters. In other words, would, and to what extent could, 
cohabitants be permitted to opt out of the statutory presumptive regime? To what 
extent would the law recognise and give effect to the private arrangements of 
cohabitants? The legal effect and validity of contractual arrangements between 
parties to a close intimate relationship have been subject to legal scrutiny, as can 
be seen from the cases dealing with pre-nuptial agreements. At present, the 
position in the U.K. remains that pre-nuptial agreements are not seen as legally 
binding on the courts. They are persuasive but not enforceable, and are of only 
                                                 
23
 See also Young & Boyd (2006) in this issue on some of the disadvantages, especially fiscal ones, faced by 
opposite-sex and same-sex cohabitants under the ascription models adopted in Canada.  
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circumstantial relevance which the courts may take into account when exercising 
their discretion.24 
 The Australian statutes all provide de facto partners with the choice to 
contract out by making their own arrangements, whether at the outset of the 
relationship or at its termination, in relation to financial and property matters. These 
agreements are, however, enforceable provided that they comply with the law of 
contract including the procedural safeguards provided in the statutes (Property 
(Relationships) Act 1984, s.47(1); Domestic Relationships Act 1994, s.33(1); 
Relationships Act 2003, s.62(1)). Some of the safeguards are: the contract must be 
in writing and signed by both parties to the agreement; a solicitor’s certificate is 
obtained prior to execution to confirm that independent legal advice has been 
provided to each party; and the solicitor’s certificate is duly endorsed on the 
agreement. On satisfying these, the courts will give effect to the agreements made 
by not making orders which would be inconsistent with the terms of the agreement. 
The agreement may also be revoked at the application to court of one of the de 
facto partners (Property (Relationships) Act 1984, s.50; Domestic Relationships 
Act 1994, s.35; Relationships Act 2003, s.64). However, the statutes do provide a 
fallback for the exercise of the courts’ discretion to make orders where, for 
example, the agreement does not satisfy any one or more of the procedural 
safeguards, or the circumstances of the parties have so changed since the making 
of the agreement that it would cause serious injustice if the agreement were to be 
enforced. In these situations, the courts may vary or set aside any one or more of 
the provisions in the agreement and/or treat the agreement as being of 
                                                 
24
 See, e.g., Layton v. Martin [1986] 2 F.L.R. 227; M v. M (Prenuptial Agreement) [2002] 1 F.L.R. 654; K v. 
K (Ancillary Relief: Prenuptial Agreement) [2003] 1 F.L.R. 120.  
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circumstantial relevance when exercising their discretion (Property (Relationships) 
Act 1984, ss.47(2) & 49; Domestic Relationships Act 1994, ss.33(2) & 34; 
Relationships Act 2003, ss.62(2) & 63).  
 When considering the question of whether cohabitants ought to be given the 
opportunity to contract out of the putative scheme, the Law Society decided 
against allowing cohabitation agreements to be binding. This was in part due to the 
disadvantages which the Law Society felt outweighed the benefits of autonomy 
and freedom, namely: that such contracts may be open to exploitation of the 
weaker party in the relationship; and that the circumstances of the parties may be 
so changed from the time of making the contract that it would not be fair to enforce 
it at the point of separation. Thus, the recommendation was to keep cohabitation 
agreements in line with pre-nuptial agreements, and to see the former as providing 
only evidential value (Law Society 2002, pp. 79-80). While it is conceded that the 
disadvantages (of allowing contracting out) highlighted by the Law Society are real, 
the Law Society’s reasoning nevertheless demonstrates one of the flaws of 
stretching the marriage model without problematising the normative value of the 
model itself. The result is to make cohabitation congruent with that model: “It 
seems illogical to allow cohabitants to make enforceable cohabitation contracts 
when married couples cannot make enforceable pre-nuptial contracts” (2002, p. 
80). Rather, the Law Society should have turned the argument on its head and 
asked the question whether the time was ripe for English courts, and parliament, to 
reconsider the legal effect of pre-nuptial agreements. By adopting an assimilation 
methodology, the Law Society closes any space for a debate on the potential for 
not only cohabitants but also married couples to exercise greater private autonomy 
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through making greater and more effective use of contractual tools to regulate their 
financial and property matters. 
 Some potential may lie in the approach taken in the Australian statutes. 
While one accepts that even the Australian sub-national statutes are not totally 
foolproof against potential abuse by the stronger party in the relationship, the 
provisions do allow, to some extent, for this danger to be addressed, by providing a 
list of procedural safeguards. Protection against potential abuse is also provided 
for, by reserving to the courts a residual power to vary or set aside any one or 
more of the provisions in the contract where enforcement would lead to serious 
injustice. Moreover, states like Tasmania have moved the goalposts even further 
by allowing de facto partners to take the added step of formalising their relationship 
(although such formalisation does not in fact confer on them any formal legal 
status) by registering a deed of relationship (Relationships Act 2003, s.11). 
Registration of a deed would allow the parties to access the law immediately rather 
than waiting for the requisite two-year period of cohabitation before the 
presumptive scheme takes hold. This use of a contractual method of formalising 
the parties’ relationship can be attractive as it provides the parties with the choice 
not only to opt out (through entering into either a personal relationship agreement 
or a separation agreement) but also expressly to opt in by drawing up a deed of 
relationship. It is hoped that the Law Commission would undertake a more robust 
review of the potential use of cohabitation contracts, and other contractual 
methods through which cohabitants may give effect to their choice of relationship, 
which might in turn lead to a re-thinking of the future use and role of pre-nuptial 
agreements in marriage.  
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There are clearly a series of questions which the Law Commission will have to 
grapple with in this project of cohabitation. What this article has set out to do is to 
demonstrate how some of these questions may find answers in the various models 
of reform proposed in the U.K. by the Law Society as well as those adopted in the 
comparative examples of the Australian sub-national statutes. These questions 
can be summarised as follows: 
• What definition should we use for defining a qualifying cohabiting relationship? 
Should the marriage model remain the starting point? Would conjugality be 
required for inclusion? This requires thinking more clearly about whether 
conjugality is the nexus of cohabitation and economic vulnerability.  
• What rights and responsibilities should be placed on cohabitants? To what 
extent should these mirror those of married couples and civil partners? The 
obvious approach of reform is to maintain a distinction between the range of 
rights and responsibilities of married couples and civil partners, and 
cohabitants. However, if the policy objective of reform is to address the issue of 
economic vulnerability, the U.K. government will have to address the question 
of whether the differential extension of rights in relation to matters such as 
property redistribution and financial provision, based on marital status, remains 
justifiable.25 
                                                 
25
 This difference in treatment based on martial status may potentially raise human rights challenges under the 
Human Rights Act 1998. It still remains unclear the extent to which the U.K. courts would recognise marital 
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• Should property adjustment regimes be more closely aligned to a property law, 
contributions-based approach or a family law, contributions- and needs-based 
approach allowing discretion to the courts in awarding remedies? Should the 
Law Commission consider adopting an approach that is restitutionary in 
nature? In such cases, careful consideration needs to be given to the extent to 
which a restitutionary approach, which tends to be backward looking, will be 
able to address a cohabitant’s economic vulnerability which may exist not only 
at the termination of the relationship but also extend beyond that for a period of 
time. 
• To what extent should financial provision be made available to cohabitants? 
Should there be time limits on the duration of these orders given that the 
overarching objective is to provide protection against economic vulnerability? 
Should the factors for consideration be limited to only the financial resources of 
and/or contributions made by each party? Or should courts be allowed to take 
into account a wider range of factors? How far should these factors mirror those 
listed in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the Civil Partnership Act 2004?  
• Should reform provide cohabitants with the choice to opt out? What contractual 
methods may be included in the presumptive scheme to enable parties to 
exercise greater autonomy over the regulation of their relationships? Should 
greater legal recognition be given to cohabitation contracts? Should these 
contracts still be confined to having only evidential value? Or is it time to allow 
such contracts to have binding effect? Principles of autonomy and freedom of 
choice of the individual will clearly lead to calls for allowing cohabitants to have 
                                                                                                                                                    
status as a ground of discrimination in the way that the Canadian courts have under their Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms 1982. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Wong (2006b). 
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the choice of opting out of a presumptive scheme. The question is how 
provisions for opting out are to be structured and, more importantly, whether 
such private arrangements will be given full binding effect.   
• Last but not least, the Law Commission will also need to address the issue of 
potential exploitation, particularly if opting out provisions were to be made 
available in their recommendations. In that case, what safeguards should 
reform provide in order to protect, as far as practicable, more vulnerable parties 
from exploitation? Would the sort of procedural safeguards provided in the 
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